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Breaking Out of the Mold: Minority-Majority Districts 
and the Sustenance of White Privilege 
Joe Mitchell  
Racial discrimination remains a major problem in the United 
States.
1
 Despite the end of slavery after the Civil War, the temporary 
establishment of inclusive Southern political systems during 
Reconstruction,
2
 and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, huge 
economic and political disparities remain between racial groups 
within the United States.
3
 The election of Barack Obama suggests 
that the United States’ racial climate has improved, but incarceration, 
education, and employment data all suggest that much more change 
is needed.
4
 In order to bring about the improvement that is so plainly 
needed, political action must be taken.
5
 In order for these political 
 
  
J.D. (2013), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2010), University of 
Minnesota. Many thanks to Will Mitchell and Janet Mitchell for their help in this project; to 
professors Russell Osgood and Barbara Flagg for introducing much of this material to me; and 
to my parents and Anastasia Woodruff for their support. 
 1. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 173–85 (2010).  
 2. See W.E.B. Du Bois, Reconstruction and Its Benefits, 15 AM. HIST. REV. 781, 795 
(1910).  
 3. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768 (1973) (noting continued existence of 
discriminatory treatment of Mexican Americans in education, employment, economics, health, 
and politics). See also Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens 
of Race, 29 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 469 (2001) (noting racial discrepancies in disenfranchisement 
rates in the 2000 election). 
 4. See generally Ian Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023 (2010) (arguing that modern mass 
incarceration of racial minorities is backlash from the Civil Rights Movement); NATL. CTR. FOR 
ED. STATS., ACHIEVEMENT GAPS: HOW BLACK AND WHITE STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
PERFORM IN MATHEMATICS AND READING ON THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL 
PROGRESS (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/studies/2009455.pdf 
(documenting a large racial gap in both educational achievement and qualification for reduced-
price lunch programs). 
 5. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (stating that “the political franchise of 
voting is . . . regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights”). 
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steps to take place, the voting public must first elect candidates who 
will support policies desired by minority communities.
6
 
The best way to improve minority political representation within 
the current political framework
7
 is to rework congressional districting 
schemes to make minority votes count. By integrating congressional 
districts, non-white voters would be able to influence a greater 
number of representatives, and white citizens would become more 
aware of the injustices that current legal systems impose on minority 
groups. This Note will proceed in five parts. Part I will discuss the 
history of minority voting rights. Part II will describe the history of 
non-white majority congressional districting schemes. Part III will 
evaluate the pros and cons of non-white majority schemes. Part IV 
criticizes the “crossover” district model proposed by some scholars. 
Lastly, Part V concludes that full integration of congressional 
districts might produce the best long-term political results for non-
white communities. 
I. A HISTORY OF MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 
Minority interests have always been excluded or marginalized in 
the American political system.
8
 Voting rights were initially reserved 
to white land-owners.
9
 As suffrage spread, exceptional steps were 
taken to prevent minority citizens from exercising meaningful 
political power.
10
 After a brief period during Reconstruction when 
Black
11
 votes and representatives were integral to Southern 
 
 6. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Democracy, Majoritarianism, and Racial Equality: A 
Response to Professor Karlan, 50 VAND. L. REV. 347 (1997) (describing necessity of legislative 
coalition-building to exert influence in a political system). 
 7. By “current political framework,” I mean a first-past-the-post, two-party system with 
congressional representatives from geographical districts. Implementing instant run-off voting, 
parliamentary-style party list voting, or other significant voting reform present potential 
improvements not discussed in this Note. 
 8. See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE 
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1993). 
 9. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2000). 
 10. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Representation and Raceblindness: The Story of Shaw v. Reno, 
in RACE LAW STORIES 497, 502–03 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008).  
 11. “When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my view that Blacks, like 
Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require 
denotation as a proper noun.” Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol42/iss1/16
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legislatures,
12
 the Jim Crow era undid much of Reconstruction’s 
racial progress.
13
 
Congress passed no civil rights litigation between Reconstruction 
and 1957,
14
 when an ineffectual bill was passed.
15
 A second hollow 
bill was passed in 1960.
16
 These bills were focused on providing the 
right to vote, but the Senate made sure that the bills, as passed, were 
toothless.
17
 
In 1960, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gomillion v. Lightfoot, a 
landmark voting rights case.
18
 That decision heralded the opening of 
a decade that saw several positive changes in the law regarding 
minority political participation.
19
 In Gomillion, the city of Tuskegee 
redrew its boundaries, originally square, to form a 28-sided figure to 
 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 
(1988). 
 12. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 500. The Reconstruction period is notable for the 
considerable action taken in a short span of time. Du Bois credits “negro rule” with enacting 
democratic government, free public schooling, and social legislation. Du Bois, supra note 2, at 
795. Du Bois concedes that the experiment of Black enfranchisement during Reconstruction 
produced the “worst imaginable” results, but concludes that the bad results were caused by the 
white community’s choice to respond with a “Reign of Terror” instead of “a campaign of 
education.” Id. at 788, 793. 
 13. See Tokaji, supra note 10, at 500–01 (stating that “as of 1940, only 3% of voting-age 
blacks in the South were even registered”). For a compelling description of the terror of the Jim 
Crow era, see Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and 
Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31 (1996). 
 14. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 504. 
 15. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634. This act established the office 
of the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 
 16. Civil Rights Act of 1960, 86 Pub. L. 449, 74 Stat. 90. This act allowed federal courts 
to wrest oversight of elections if a “pattern or practice” of exclusion was found, but due to 
various factors, especially the reluctance of district judges to utilize the provision, the bill was a 
dead letter. See also Tokaji, supra note 10, at 505. 
 17. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 504–05. Strom Thurmond delivered a filibuster of more than 
twenty-four hours before the passage of the 1957 act, and a coalition of Southern senators 
filibustered the 1960 act. See Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. 
L. REV. 1003, 1027 (2011) (describing Thurmond’s 1957 filibuster as the longest on record); 
Robert D. Loevy, Introduction: The Background and Setting of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL 
SEGREGATION 36 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997) (describing filibuster of 1960 act). 
 18. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).  
 19. See infra notes 22–36 and accompanying text. 
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exclude Blacks from city politics.
20
 The Court ruled that Tuskegee’s 
new lines were unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment.
21
 
Two years later, Baker v. Carr moved districting claims, which 
under Gomillion were litigated under the Fifteenth Amendment, to 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
22
 Six 
justices found that the state districting at issue was justiciable under 
the Equal Protection Clause, but the justices split three–three on how 
to apply the clause.
23
 The analysis was left unclear until Reynolds v. 
Sims, decided in 1964.
24
 In Reynolds, the Court held that state 
electoral districts that varied in population by up to a factor of forty-
one were unconstitutional.
25
 The Court stated that “the right of 
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a 
citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free 
exercise of the franchise.”26 The opinion in Reynolds rang in a new 
era in which efforts were made to include minority voices in the 
political process.
27
 
In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act.
28
 This act, unlike 
its predecessors of 1957 and 1960, provided substantial support to 
minority voters’ political rights.29 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
barred practices that infringed on minority vote participation, and 
Section 4 required certain states to cease using literacy tests.
30
 
Section 5 required certain states to pre-clear changes in voting 
procedures by obtaining a pre-clearance from the Department of 
Justice or an approving declaratory judgment from the D.C. Circuit 
Court.
31
 The Voting Rights Act had a dramatic impact, and minority 
 
 20. 364 U.S. at 340. 
 21. Id. at 346. 
 22. 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). 
 23. Id. at 251 (Clark, J., concurring).  
 24. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 25. Id. at 546–47 (Jefferson County, with a population of over 634,684, received the same 
representation as Lowndes County, with a population of 15,417). 
 26. Id. at 555.  
 27. See infra notes 28–36. 
 28. Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2011)). 
 29. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation 
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1838 (1992). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 79 Stat. at 439. The Attorney General was tasked to 
name states or subdivisions within states that would be required to obtain pre-clearance. Any 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol42/iss1/16
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Breaking Out of the Mold 239 
 
 
political participation rose dramatically following the Act’s 
ratification.
32
 The judicial system, at times, vigorously implemented 
the Act.
33
 In 1969 in Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, the Court held 
that four different methods of undermining minority political 
participation were each independently illegal, finding that the Act 
was “aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations 
which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because 
of their race.”34 In White v. Regester, the Court barred the use of 
multi-member electoral districts, finding the method to “enhance[] 
the opportunity for racial discrimination.”35 The Act and its early 
jurisprudence combined to be a successful first step towards 
incorporating long-repressed minority groups into the political life of 
the United States.
36
 
As the momentum generated by the Civil Rights movement 
cooled, the Court’s vigorous defense of the Act’s provisions also lost 
ground.
37
 In 1980, the Court considered Mobile v. Bolden and 
concluded that in order to disqualify a voting plan, plaintiffs must 
show both a racially disparate impact and racially discriminatory 
 
state that had less than 50 percent of its eligible voters registered to vote on November 1, 1964 
was automatically required to obtain authorization for any changes in electoral practice. 79 Stat. 
at 438. 
 32. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 507. Tokaji notes that the Act’s impact was in large part due 
to the Section 5 pre-clearance requirement. North Carolina, unlike the rest of the South, was 
only partially required to gain pre-clearance. It went from having the highest minority voting 
rate before the Act’s passage to the second-lowest rate after the Act’s implementation. Id. 
 33. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
 34. Id. at 565. 
 35. 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973). The Court held that an election scheme was justiciable if 
the plaintiff could “produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to 
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question—that 
its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the 
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” Id. The Court’s opinion in White 
“failed to articulate the basis for its invalidation,” leaving it to later cases. Issacharoff, supra 
note 29, at 1843. A standard was more clearly articulated in Zimmer v. McKeithen, in which the 
Court affirmed a “totality of the circumstances” evidentiary test. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(en banc), aff’d. sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). See 
Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1844 (noting that the Supreme Court gave no clear definition of 
“minority vote dilution” and noting that the opinions failed to identify what aspects of the 
challenged plans were unacceptable). 
 36. See Mark E. Rush, The Hidden Costs of Electoral Reform, in FAIR AND EFFECTIVE 
REPRESENTATION? DEBATING ELECTORAL REFORM AND MINORITY RIGHTS, 69, 92–93 (Mark 
E. Rush & Richard L. Engstrom eds., 2001). 
 37. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (discussing Mobile).  
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intent.
38
 This development weakened the Voting Rights Act greatly, 
because states could craft policies that had discriminatory effects, and 
ensure their approval by stating that traditional goals of districting 
motivated the plan.
39
 
In response, Congress updated the Voting Rights Act in 1982.
40
 
The original Act of 1965 barred voting practices intended “to deny or 
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color.”41 The amended act stated that any plan that 
“results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the 
United States to vote on account of race or color [violated the act].”42 
This change overruled Mobile and enabled courts to find a violation 
wherever a plan had a discriminatory effect, regardless of intent.
43
 
The Act requires courts to include in their analysis consideration of 
“whether minorities are able to elect candidates of their choice,” 
though the Act does not mandate proportional representation.
44
 
In 1986, the Supreme Court examined the 1982 amendment in 
Thornburg v. Gingles.
45
 The amended legislation caused the Court to 
significantly alter its evidentiary inquiry, as it attempted to apply a 
standard of “functional” inequality.46 The result was a three-pronged 
test: to state a claim under the Act, a plaintiff needed to show that 
(1) a minority is present in sufficient compactness to enable the 
minority group to dominate a single district; (2) the minority group is 
substantially “politically cohesive”; and (3) the minority group has 
been subjected to electoral defeat by majority candidates.
47
 If the 
 
 38. 446 U.S. 55, 68–69 (1980) (plurality opinion). This opinion relied on precedent set by 
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), which held that a plaintiff’s claims of vote dilution 
were rightfully dismissed when plaintiff was unable to show discriminatory intent. Wright was 
decided before the Voting Rights Act was passed, so Mobile adopted the Wright doctrine 
despite the intervening legislation. See 446 U.S. at 63. 
 39. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 509. 
 40. 96 Stat. 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971). 
 41. Rush, supra note 36, at 93. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1846. See also S. REP. NO. 417, at 35 (1982), reprinted 
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179 (reporting explicit legislative intent to eliminate the Bolden test 
in favor of a results-oriented test). 
 44. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 510. 
 45. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 46. Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1851. 
 47. 478 U.S. at 50–51; see also Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1852. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol42/iss1/16
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Breaking Out of the Mold 241 
 
 
plaintiff can meet those three tests, a majority non-white district
48
 is 
created to allow the affected minority community to elect a candidate 
of its choosing.
49
 
II. THE ADVENT OF NON-WHITE MAJORITY CONGRESSIONAL 
DISTRICTING PLANS 
After Gingles, legislatures began to create non-white majority 
districts in many communities that met the Gingles three-part test.
50
 
The effects of the decision soon had an impact on the makeup of 
government.
51
 “1992 was the pivotal year for black representation in 
Congress . . . . Overall, the number of blacks elected to the House 
from Southern states increased from five in 1990 to seventeen in 
1992, ‘solely as a consequence of the increase in the number of black 
majority congressional districts.’”52 Gingles, decided in 1986, 
allowed Black congressional representation to more than triple in just 
one redistricting cycle. 
After the redistricting process that followed the 1990 census, the 
racially charged politics of North Carolina begat a legal challenge to 
the districting scheme, which had created majority-Black districts.
53
 
The Democrats wanted to create fewer majority-Black districts so as 
to avoid “bleaching” and maintain strong demographic support in a 
greater number of districts, whereas Republicans hoped to create as 
many majority-Black districts as possible, in order to create more 
districts bleached of minority votes.
54
 The redistricting committee, 
 
 48. Many articles refer to such districts as “majority-minority.” In light of the fact that the 
white population will soon drop below 50 percent, I use “majority non-white.” Cf. Pamela S. 
Karlan, The Partisan of Nonpartisanship: Justice Stevens and the Law of Democracy, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2187 (2006). 
 49. 478 U.S. at 51.  
 50. See DAVID A. BOSITIS, REDISTRICTING AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION: LEARNING 
FROM THE PAST, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 4 (1998). Bositis wrote that “[i]n 1990 . . . one 
thing was quite clear—the federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, were favorably 
disposed toward the creation of majority-minority districts,” and adds that both Democrats and 
Republicans supported the change. Id. 
 51. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 508–09. 
 52. Id. at 508 (quoting Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, 1990s Issues in Voting Rights, 
65 MISS. L.J. 205, 220 (1995)). 
 53. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 511.  
 54. Id. at 512. 
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“loaded with both Democrats and black legislators,”55 proposed a 
plan that created one majority-Black district.
56
 The Republicans 
countered with a plan that included “two majority-black districts . . . 
[but] would give Republicans the edge in seven of the remaining ten 
districts.”57 The Democrats’ plan was denied pre-clearance, but 
instead of adopting a plan similar to the Republican plan, the 
Democrats created a second majority-Black district that was 
unusually convoluted: it connected Charlotte and Durham with a 160-
mile stretch that consisted primarily of an interstate highway.
58
 The 
plan was granted pre-clearance by the Department of Justice.
59
 
After it was approved, Republicans immediately challenged the 
new districting scheme.
60
 In Shaw v. Barr, a professor at Duke Law 
School, along with four other voters, challenged the districting plan 
on the grounds of race discrimination.
61
 The three-judge district court 
panel rejected the complaint, though one judge dissented.
62
 The 
Supreme Court accepted the case for briefing, renamed as Shaw v. 
Reno.
63
 The single question to be argued was whether irrationally 
shaped boundary lines, crafted for racial purposes, amounted to an 
unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
64
 Some worried that “the Court’s 
decision could sound the [Voting Rights] Act’s death knell.”65  
 
 55. Id. at 513. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 514. This plan included eight safe Democratic districts with an additional swing 
district, of North Carolina’s twelve districts. Id. 
 59. Id. at 515. 
 60. Id. at 515. See also Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (challenging the 
same districting plan not on racial but on political gerrymander grounds). In Davis v. Bandemer, 
478 U.S. 109 (1986), the Court held that purely political gerrymanders did present a justiciable 
equal protection claim, but the plaintiffs in both Davis and Pope failed to present a sufficient 
showing of discriminatory vote dilution, and in both cases the challenged plan withstood 
judicial review.  
 61. 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1993). See also Tokaji, supra note 10, at 516. 
 62. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 473. 
 63. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 64. Id. at 633–34. An earlier formulation of the issue was whether compliance with the 
pre-clearance provision of the Act immunized the state from districting litigation. That 
formulation left the Court with only one answer. “The intent to comply with the [any statute] 
. . . could not possibly immunize a plan from a constitutional challenge.” Tokaji, supra note 10, 
at 521. 
 65. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 523. At oral argument, both parties acknowledged that the 
Voting Rights Act required some race-conscious action. Thus, some proponents of non-white 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol42/iss1/16
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When it came down, the majority “concluded that taking account 
of race to include blacks was no less constitutionally suspect than 
using race to exclude them,”66 though “the majority left some wiggle 
room for the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts.”67 The 
Court remanded the case to determine if the districting was racially 
motivated, and if so, if it met strict scrutiny analysis.
68
 Subsequent 
appeals and re-litigation in adjoining districts caused the Court to 
hear four different challenges to North Carolina’s congressional 
districting scheme.
69
 The last of these resulted in a finding that the 
revised districting scheme was constitutional because it was 
motivated by political, not racial, concerns.
70
  
After Shaw, congressional redistricting schemes were required to 
take race into account under the Voting Rights Act, because the 1982 
Amendments require some degree of race-conscious districting.
71
 
However, the final Shaw decision subjected districts with bizarre 
shapes to strict scrutiny when race was the predominant motive in the 
district’s creation.72 
This contradiction—that race must be considered under the Act, 
but cannot be a predominant factor under Shaw—was examined by 
the Court in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry 
(LULAC).
73
 In LULAC, the Court reaffirmed the Gingles test, and 
held that Texas’s gerrymandered redistricting was constitutional 
except for a Latino-majority district, which had been altered by 
increasing the white population.
74
 This decision upheld the Texas 
 
majority districting schemes worried that the Supreme Court might hold that race-conscious 
districting was subject to strict scrutiny. 
 66. Id. at 525. 
 67. Id. at 528. 
 68. 509 U.S. at 658. 
 69. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 529–35. 
 70. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001). 
 71. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself? Social Science 
and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1523–24, 1540–41 (2002). 
 72. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996). For a discussion of challenges to “bizarre 
districts” after Shaw v. Reno, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, 
‘Bizarre Districts,’ and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. 
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993). 
 73. 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 74. The Court required that the district be redrawn to maintain a Latino majority. Id. at 
447. The Court rephrased the Gingles test, stating that the creation of a non-white majority 
district is proper when “(1) the racial group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to 
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plan’s destruction of a district in which a significant Black 
community had been able to elect its candidate of choice.
75
 The Court 
held that because the Black community did not comprise a majority 
of the district’s eligible voters, the destruction of the district did not 
violate the Act.
76
 The decision created a legal distinction protecting 
groups with 50 percent of a district’s population, but failing to protect 
groups that constitute only 49 percent.
77
 This distinction is best 
described as “the Court’s unwillingness to look at the political 
realities of each case.”78 
In 2009, the Court continued to limit its Act doctrine to districts 
with an absolute majority of minority voters in Bartlett v. 
Strickland.
79
 In Bartlett, the Court considered North Carolina’s 
district plan that eliminated a non-white majority district and replaced 
it with a “crossover” district.80 A crossover district is one in which 
the minority makes up “less than a majority of the voting 
population,” but is nonetheless “large enough to elect the candidate 
of its choice with help from voters who are members of the majority 
and who cross over to support the minority’s preferred candidate.”81 
The Court held that the Act did not recognize crossover districts as an 
equivalent of a majority-minority district under the Act.
82
 The Court 
noted that the specific community in question did not qualify under 
Gingles, and thereby excused the legislature from creating a majority 
 
constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) the racial group is politically cohesive; and 
(3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate.” Id. at 425 (internal quotations omitted). By reaffirming the Gingles test, 
the Court gave greater judicial support to the creation of non-white majority congressional 
districts. The Court’s focus on racial gerrymandering, in contrast with its tolerance of political 
gerrymandering, ignored the inseparable relationship between race and political affiliation. 
Franita Tolson, Increasing the Quantity and the Quality of the African-American Vote: Lessons 
for 2008 and Beyond, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y 313, 328 (2008). 
 75. Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L. J. 734, 747 (2008). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 748. 
 78. Tolson, supra note 74, at 328. 
 79. 556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 13. Often these districts will be majority white and majority Democrat, but a 
majority of the Democrats will be non-white. The minority community can select its candidate 
of choice in the Democratic primary, and that candidate can be expected to win the general 
election. Pildes, supra note 71, at 1534. 
 82. 556 U.S. at 24 26 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).  
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non-white district,
83
 but the effect of the decision was to deny 
influence districts the protection of the Act.
84
 This decision, over four 
dissenters, effectively limited the protection of minority voting 
interests to the traditional Gingles majority non-white districts.
85
 
Justice Souter, in dissent, disapproved of the restriction on forming 
crossover districts: “[a] crossover is thus superior to a majority-
minority district precisely because it requires polarized factions to 
break out of the mold and form the coalitions that discourage racial 
divisions.”86 
In Northwest Austin Municipal Utilities District No. One v. 
Holder (NAMUDNO),
87
 also decided in 2009, the Court appeared to 
be ready to strike down Section 5 of the Act as unconstitutional.
88
 
Congress extended the Act in 2006 over some objection,
89
 and 
commentators thought that the Court might declare that the 
conditions requiring the use of race-conscious districting had passed, 
removing the “rational purpose” required for race-based 
governmental action.
90
 The Court declined to strike down the Act, 
finding that its protections might still be necessary.
91
 However, the 
Court appears willing to rethink its holding in NAMUDNO: in 
February 2013, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Shelby 
County v. Holder, a case in which the sole question to be presented is 
whether Section 5 of the Act is constitutional.
92
 
The Voting Rights Act has been an extremely effective method of 
improving minority groups’ access to political power.93 The Act has 
 
 83. Id. at 24. 
 84. Id. at 24 25. The Court noted that state bodies would remain free to create influence 
or crossover districts, but would not be required to by the Act. 
 85. Id. at 34 35 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 86. Id. 
 87. 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
 88. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act, 
36 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 697, 702 (2009). 
 89. J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 
1965–2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 760 (2008). 
 90. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 88, at 742–43. 
 91. 557 U.S. at 211. 
 92. Transcript of Oral Argument, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. argued Feb. 27, 
2013), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-96 .pdf.  
 93. In NAMUDNO, the Court wrote: 
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enabled lawmakers to actively design districts with the intent to 
advance political interests of racial minority groups.
94
 The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on the topic has favored the creation of 
majority non-white districts.
95
 This is most clearly shown by the 
Court’s refusal to allow minority groups to utilize crossover districts 
in order to gain more political representation.
96
 Whether or not this 
preference for absolute majority districts is good for minority 
political interests is the topic of much debate.
97
 
III. ARE MAJORITY NON-WHITE DISTRICTS GOOD FOR MINORITY 
REPRESENTATION? 
Professor Eisgruber argues that the existence of long-standing 
political racial division allows for majoritarianism.
98
 The best and 
only means of fighting majoritarianism is to ameliorate racial 
divisions; he argued that a congressional districting scheme should be 
designed to reduce racial divisions.
99
 Whether majority non-white 
districting helps to reduce racial division is a contested question. The 
discussion has focused on two types of political representation: 
descriptive and substantive.
100
 Descriptive representation is 
representation of a minority community by a member of that 
minority, whereas substantive representatives are those who prefer 
 
The historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights Act are undeniable. When it was 
first passed, unconstitutional discrimination was rampant and the registration of 
voting-age whites ran roughly 50 percentage points or more ahead of black registration 
in many covered States. Today, the registration gap between white and black voters is 
in single digits in the covered States; in some of those States, blacks now register and 
vote at higher rates than whites. 
557 U.S. at 201 (internal quotation omitted). 
 94. Tolson, supra note 74, at 327 (stating that in Shaw, “the Court held that under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, majority-minority districts can be used to remedy the effects of past 
discrimination.”). 
 95. See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399 (2006), and Bartlett, 556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
 96. Bartlett, 556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
 97. See infra notes 98–132 and accompanying text. 
 98. Eisgruber, supra note 6, at 355. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially 
Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2226 (2003). 
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the same policies and hold the same values as the minority 
community, regardless of race.
101
 
A. Arguments for Majority Non-White Districting 
Many scholars have reviewed the Supreme Court’s voting 
jurisprudence evolution with increasing trepidation.
102
 The strict 
scrutiny analysis applied in Shaw
103
 and the hesitance of many 
legislators to renew the Act in 2006 has alerted academics to the fact 
that many believe that the Act’s disadvantages may outweigh its 
benefits.
104
 Some of those academics have defended the Act and the 
traditional majority non-white districting pattern; this Section will 
discuss the arguments made in support of that position. 
The most obvious advantage to the Act’s creation of majority non-
white congressional districts is that those districts produce descriptive 
representation.
105
 Representatives of these districts are highly likely 
to be members of the dominant racial minority, which is in line with 
the Act’s aims.106 This descriptive representation can have a positive 
and empowering effect on members of the minority community.
107
 In 
addition to psychological benefits, some argue that descriptive 
representation can have positive effects on minority political 
 
 101. Id. (noting that descriptive representation “operates on the assumption that someone of 
the same race . . . will be more sensitive to the needs and concerns of people who [are of the 
same race].”). 
 102. See Thomas Brunell, David Lublin, Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Do We Still 
Need the VRA? In a Word: ‘YES’, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY, U. CALIFORNIA-
IRVINE (2007), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3801w0n7. 
 103. See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text. 
 104. Kousser, supra note 89, at 743–62 (discussing the viewpoints of legislators on how to 
amend and interpret sections 2 and 5 of the Act). 
 105. See Brunell et al., supra note 102, at 24 (noting that “minority districts remain[] the 
basis upon which most African-American and Latino officials gain election.”). 
 106. Note, supra note 100, at 2227 (noting that “there is value simply in having elected 
officials who look like . . . those they represent.”). See also Abigail Thernstrom, More Notes 
from a Political Thicket, 44 EMORY L.J. 911, 934 (1995) (dismissing the argument that Black 
candidates who advance positions contrary to prevailing Black opinion are inauthentically 
Black). 
 107. Lenore Look, My Mother’s Vote, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY., Mar. 19, 1997, at 56 
(describing the political empowerment of an immigrant who chose to vote for the first time 
because a candidate from the same racial background was running for office). 
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participation.
108
 Some studies have concluded that majority non-white 
congressional districts enhance minority voter turnout.
109
 
Descriptive representation also ensures that elected officials will 
have personal knowledge of the minority group’s experience, which 
should enable the representative to combat political problems more 
effectively.
110
 Lastly, some argue that descriptive representation can 
facilitate cross-racial discussion, because representatives from 
majority non-white districts can gain national media audiences and 
spark discussion of racial issues on a national level.
111
 
Majority non-white districts are an excellent vehicle to create 
descriptive representation.
112
 Some argue that these districts also 
produce better substantive non-white representation,
113
 though others 
disagree.
114
 Proponents of majority non-white districts argue that 
majority non-white districts provide a unique opportunity for 
minority communities to participate in the political process.
115
 The 
proponents claim that majority non-white districts can create a 
congressional coalition equal to or larger than other successful 
coalitions, implying that the size of the coalition is the key to 
meaningful political power.
116
 
 
 108. Id. See also CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE 
REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 5 (1993). 
 109. See Matt A. Barreto, Gary M. Segura & Nathan D. Woods, The Mobilizing Effect of 
Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 65, 74 (2004) (“Latinos 
vote more when in a majority-Latino district.”); Lawrence Bobo & Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., 
Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 377, 387 
(1990) (“Where Blacks hold positions of political power, they are more [politically] active.”). 
But see Tolson, supra note 74, and infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 110. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (arguing that those who are subjected to the most 
oppression are best positioned to formulate effective solutions). 
 111. Kang, supra note 75, at 787–88. 
 112. See Brunell et al., supra note 102. 
 113. See infra notes 116–23 and accompanying text. 
 114. “[A]n increase in descriptive representation . . . often results in a decline in 
substantive representation. The reason is that increases in descriptive representation are 
accomplished by creating majority-minority districts, which involves placing most of a state’s 
black voters together in a relatively small number of districts.” Note, supra note 100, at 2226. 
 115. Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of the Century, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 291, 300 (1997) (stating that “insular, well-organized constituencies often enjoy 
disproportionate influence relative to diffuse groups”). 
 116. Id. Critics say that this argument wrongly assumes that minority representatives are 
able to effectively participate in coalition-building just like any other specialized interest group. 
Eisgruber, supra note 6, at 355. Some go so far as to say that this framework “encourages the 
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Michael Kang presents a second argument for why majority non-
white districts are good for minority substantive representation.
117
 
Kang argues that splitting minority communities into many different 
districts would force minority voters to engage in bloc voting out of 
necessity.
118
 By isolating minority groups into a district under 
complete minority control, majority non-white districts allow 
“members who once banded together defensively against the white 
majority” to “consider nuanced differences among them,” facilitating 
a more dynamic, competitive, and pluralist political community.
119
 
By creating districts in which “only black ballots are meant to 
count,”120 Black voters can be “relieve[d] [of] the pressures inherent 
in racial polarization”121 while simultaneously “mitigat[ing] the 
damaging effects of racial polarization on political discourse.”122 
B. Arguments Against Majority Non-White Districting 
Critics of majority non-white districting concede that such 
districts do produce descriptive representation.
123
 These critics argue 
that majority non-white districts inhibit minority substantive 
representation.
124
 First, some disagree with the proposition that 
minority non-white districts produce higher voter turnout.
125
 Second, 
these scholars state that Professor Kang’s hope that majority non-
 
white majority to see minorities as an interest group like the oil industry or gun companies,” 
further reducing minority representatives’ ability to influence policy. Jason Rathod, A Post-
Racial Voting Rights Act, 13 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 139, 177 (2011). 
 117. Kang, supra note 75. 
 118. Id. at 781. 
 119. Id. at 781–82. 
 120. Thernstrom, supra note 106, at 917. 
 121. Kang, supra note 75, at 787. 
 122. Id. at 788. 
 123. Pildes, supra note 71, at 1562 (stating that “a genuine tradeoff exists between 
descriptive and substantive representation”). 
 124. Critics of majority non-white districts recognize that efforts to eliminate such districts 
“ask[] blacks to give up sure gains (more black people in elite positions) plus speculative future 
improvements in exchange for nothing but speculative future improvements.” Eisgruber, supra 
note 6, at 359. Despite the risk, Eisgruber believes that “majority-black districts may do more 
harm than good.” Id. 
 125. Tolson, supra note 74, at 336 (noting that majority non-white districts improved voter 
turnout initially, but stating that such districts now inhibit voter turnout). But see Barreto, 
Segura & Woods, supra note 109. 
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white districting can produce positive intra-group political 
competition has not been realized.
126
  
Despite the greater descriptive representation created by majority 
non-white congressional districts, many scholars believe that 
eliminating such districts would improve the substantive 
representation of minority communities.
127
 Majority non-white 
districts are alleged to “reward racially polarizing candidates, 
handicap minorities from winning politically powerful statewide 
races, and reproduce race as an organizing principle of American 
society.”128  
The current scheme of non-white majority districts rewards 
racially polarizing candidates both in and out of the districts, by 
encouraging candidates to appeal to their relatively monochromatic 
electorate with racially coded language.
129
 The current scheme also 
negatively impacts the party that most minority voters prefer: the 
establishment of non-white majority districts has “cost the Democrats 
a total of seventeen seats” in Congress.130  
 
 126. Tolson, supra note 74, at 314 (“African-Americans should focus less on . . . creat[ing] 
majority-minority districts because these districts . . . have the effect of depressing voter 
turnout.”). In the 2010 congressional elections, fifteen candidates in contested elections won at 
least 84 percent of the vote. Twelve of those candidates were from majority non-white districts. 
Thirty-two candidates in contested elections won 80 percent of the vote; nineteen of those were 
from majority non-white districts. Spreadsheet on file with author. This data suggests that 
despite Professor Kang’s theory, meaningful electoral competition is absent in general elections 
in majority non-white districts. See Rathod, supra note 116, at 191–92 (“majority-minority 
districts do not liberate voters from engaging in racial politics as Professor Kang asserts. 
Instead, they create environments obsessed with race in which polarizing candidates win by 
engaging in rhetoric of excess.”). But see Angela Onwauchi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the 
SCT? What Justice Clarence Thomas Teaches Us about the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 931, 1008–09 (2005) (noting a lack of communication between Black liberals 
and conservatives, and calling for improved dialogue between the groups). 
 127. “What is [more important than descriptive representation] is the desire and need that 
African-Americans have for substantive representation, which requires more than simply 
descriptive representation.” Tolson, supra note 74, at 318. See also infra notes 131–47. 
 128. Rathod, supra note 116, at 140. 
 129. See id. at 182 (explaining Jesse Jackson’s opposition to Barack Obama’s 2008 
campaign as a response to the threat Obama posed to the racially divisive political climate in 
which Jackson thrived); id. at 168 (noting that in white communities, “shameless politicians 
appeal[ed] to a racialized law-and-order vote”). 
 130. Karlan, supra note 115, at 303 n.32 (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Southern Comfort, NEW 
REPUBLIC 4 (Jan. 8 & 15, 1996). See also Ari Berman, How the GOP is Resegregating the 
South, THE NATION, Jan. 31, 2012. The current districting scheme strongly favors Republicans: 
Democratic House candidates could win the popular aggregate vote by up to 5 percent and still 
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The arguments against majority non-white districting appear to be 
gaining broader acceptance.
131
 Black leaders are abandoning their 
“unholy alliance” with Republicans for more majority non-white 
districts, in large part because those districts are now clearly harming 
Democratic political representation.
132
 
C. Crossover Districting: The Consensus Alternative to Majority 
Non-White Districting 
The growing chorus of activists dissatisfied with majority non-
white districting are unifying behind one idea: crossover 
districting.
133
 These studies suggest that instead of focusing on the 
creation of districts with an absolute non-white majority, advocates 
should work for districts with a sufficient minority population to 
make minority control of electoral outcomes extremely likely.
134
  
Replacing majority non-white districts with crossover districts 
would represent a significant victory for minority political 
representation. Most obviously, it would enable non-white voters to 
influence a greater number of districts.
135
 Less obviously, a crossover 
district would require “winning candidates to appeal to civic 
nationalism. They encourage citizens to build coalitions across the 
 
be in the minority in the House. Sam Wang, The House—New, With Less Democracy!, 
PRINCETON ELECTION CONSORTIUM (Nov. 9, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://election.princeton.edu/ 
2012/11/09/the-new-house-with-less-democracy/. 
 131. See Berman, supra note 130. 
 132. Id. (quoting Stacey Abrams, the first Black leader of the Georgia House: “Republicans 
intentionally targeted white Democrats, thinking that as an African-American leader I wouldn’t 
fight against these maps because I got an extra number of black seats . . . . I’m not the chair of 
the ‘black caucus.’ I’m the leader of the Democratic caucus. And the Democratic caucus has to 
be racially integrated in order to be reflective of the state.”). 
 133. See supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. See also Rathod, supra note 116, at 
144 (“Congress should codify an approach to vote dilution that will maximize the number of 
crossover districts and minimize the number of majority-minority districts.”); Tolson, supra 
note 74, at 347–48; Gilda R. Daniels, Racial Redistricting in a Post-Racial World, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 947, 965 (2011) (“advocates should embrace . . . crossover and influence districts.”). 
 134. According to one study, the optimal minority makeup of a district in North Carolina is 
38.37 percent. Rathod, supra note 116, at 196. In other states, optimal percentages range from 
35 percent to greater than 46 percent. Note, supra note 100, at 2218. Districts where more 
whites are willing to vote for a non-white candidate require smaller non-white populations. Id. 
 135. Rathod, supra note 116, at 198 (“as a matter of simple math, states can draw more 
crossover districts than majority-minority districts”). 
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color line and ‘pull, haul, and trade to find common political 
ground.’”136  
IV. DO CROSSOVER DISTRICTS LEAVE TOO MANY WHITES OUT OF 
THE LOOP? 
A political system in which citizens “pull, haul, and trade” would 
have significant effects on both non-white and white communities. 
Since white voters control most political power in the country, 
support from a significant number of white voters will be needed to 
pass any legislation sought by minority groups.
137
 Accordingly, the 
most important feature of a congressional districting proposal is the 
scheme’s ability to transform white voters into citizens working 
against continued racial oppression. This Note argues that creating 
racially integrated congressional districts could efficiently expose 
white voters to minority political concerns.
138
 Only citizens who are 
aware of the continued oppression of minorities will undertake 
political action to end the oppression.
139
 Eliminating majority non-
white districts would increase cross-racial political contact and 
detract from race’s central role in political identity.140 Crossover 
 
 136. Id. (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994)). 
 137. Derrick Bell, Wanted: A White Leader Able to Free Whites of Racism, 33 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 527, 535 (2000). 
 138. If white voters are exposed to campaign material emphasizing minority concerns, the 
message will get through: “Campaign messages do appear to increase voter information.” 
Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect, and Repetition in 
Public Debate, 75 MO. L. REV. 143, 152–53 (2010). Other methods of spreading knowledge 
about white privilege have failed to gain traction; one conference on white privilege was 
described in a major newspaper as a “white guilt festival” designed “for navel-gazing or self-
flagellation.” Katherine Kersten, Always Room in the Budget for White Guilt, MINNEAPOLIS 
STAR-TRIBUNE, Apr. 10, 2011, at OP3. 
 139. See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal 
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 404 (1982–83) 
(describing white juror who, upon hearing “black rage” criminal defense, “opened her eyes to 
the life of black America”). 
 140. Rathod, supra note 116, at 178–79 (eliminating majority non-white districting would 
“destabiliz[e] primordial conceptions of race premised on the ascription of identities 
corresponding to the ethno-racial pentagon, and [would] cultivat[e] conceptions in which 
affiliation with provincial communities, descent-oriented and otherwise, is voluntary.”). But see 
Karlan, supra note 115, at 320–21 (predicting that desegregated congressional districts would 
encourage race-baiting by white politicians: “You might beseech a Southern white tenant to 
listen to you upon questions of finance, taxation, and transportation . . . but if . . . the town 
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districts move towards that end.
141
 I submit that it is possible that 
crossover districting, while an improvement over majority non-white 
districting, may not be superior to full integration. 
Crossover districting schemes require districts to have substantial 
minority populations, between 35 and 46 percent.
142
 According to the 
2010 census, 63.7 percent of the U.S. population was white and not 
Hispanic or Latino.
143
 Many states have even whiter populations, so 
there are necessarily many political communities where a non-white 
population of 35 percent or greater is statistically impossible.
144
 A 
community that cannot reach the 35 percent threshold should not 
remain entirely segregated. As long as a sufficient number of 
minorities are present in a district to encourage at least one major 
candidate to court minority votes, the inclusion of minority voters 
will help spread political information about the issues facing non-
white citizens.
145
 
The isolation of white voters in bleached districts adversely 
affects minority political interests.
146
 Conservative white voters who 
are opposed to welfare are highly likely to be misinformed about 
racially divisive issues such as welfare, yet these voters have 
extremely high confidence in their incorrect beliefs.
147
 To fight such 
misconceptions, direct contact is required: “we respond more 
strongly to in-person appeals than impersonal, mass appeals.”148 
Including minority communities in as many districts as possible will 
ensure that one or both main party candidates include a discussion of 
 
politician . . . came along and cried ‘Negro rule!’ the entire fabric of reason and common sense 
. . . would fall.”). 
 141. See supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 134. 
 143. Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto R. Ramirez, Overview of Race and 
Hispanic Origin: 2010, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, at 4 (Mar. 2011), available at http:// 
www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Rathod, supra note 116, at 189 (“schemes that require cross-racial support for victory 
advance interracial conciliation”). 
 146. See supra notes 124–32 and accompanying text. 
 147. James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder & Robert Rich, 
Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship, 62 J. POL. 790, 798 (2000) (“Most 
respondents . . . hold mistaken beliefs that reinforce each other and thus have a cumulative anti-
welfare effect . . . . [T]hose holding the least accurate beliefs perversely expressed the highest 
confidence in them.”). 
 148. Sheff, supra note 138, at 158. 
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minority interests in their campaigns, thus directly exposing a 
maximum number of white citizens to non-white political interests. 
Crossover districts cap the integration of political communities. If 
the end goal of districting is to create districts with 35 to 45 percent 
non-white populations, then there will remain a significant number of 
bleached districts. While crossover districts appear at first glance to 
allow minority communities to have their cake and eat it too,
149
 such 
a scheme may backfire because it leaves many white citizens 
untouched by minority concerns. Full integration would mean that 
minority voters would represent a smaller voting population within 
each district, but more white voters would participate in a political 
system that included discussion of minority voter concerns. Because I 
believe that the political support of white citizens is a necessary 
prerequisite to fix the United States’ racial problems, I suspect that a 
solution will come faster if congressional districts are designed 
primarily to expose white voters to political issues of racial injustice. 
I concede that this may come at some cost to short-term minority 
representation.
150
 
V. A PERSONAL CONCLUSION 
Several years ago, my grandmother’s church celebrated the fiftieth 
anniversary of its integration. After the festivities, my grandmother 
remarked to me: “I remember being proud on that day, that we were 
integrating. But I saw a black man sitting with a white woman, and I 
remember thinking ‘that is wrong.’ The memory of that thought has 
embarrassed me now for a long time.” There was nothing inevitable 
about my grandmother’s transformation on interracial relationships. 
She changed her mind, in part, due to her involvement in an 
integrated community. Without restructuring our congressional 
 
 149. In a crossover district, the minority community is able to select a candidate in both the 
primary and general election, giving both descriptive and substantive representation. 
 150. This suggestion is certainly vulnerable to criticism. My proposed solution to a lack of 
minority political power appears to give even more power to white voters. Nonetheless, I 
believe that “[t]he racial problem in this country is not people of color but whites.” Bell, supra 
note 137, at 532. Bell doubts that descriptive representation is of any particular use: “When 
dealing directly with race, however, any black’s message will be dismissed at best as special 
pleading and at worst as racial condemnation.” Id. Because systems of racism and privilege are 
maintained and built by whites, I believe that they must be destroyed by whites. 
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districts, white voters will not become aware of, or reject, structural 
racism. Integrating electoral districts would cause white voters to 
become more aware of the political challenges faced by minority 
communities, thereby improving substantive minority representation. 
Too few whites are exposed to the problems caused by white 
privilege in the United States. Too many political communities and 
voting districts are almost exclusively white. It’s time we break the 
mold. 
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